There intimate connections between the 2007-9 financial crisis, ineffective regulation and the scandals that preceded that calamity, have led to rising demands for the re-evaluation and smarter coordination of the financial sector's governance, supervision and enforcement mechanisms with a view to preventing their recurrences. The calls for changes in the current systems come on the backdrop of the recognition that the financial fiascos cast a shadow over the ability of codes of conduct, traditional supervisory and enforce ment strategies to insulate the global financial sector from failure. In essence, demands for a new architecture in the governance of the pilloried sector are embedded in the critical need to re-instil trust and credibility eroded by inter alia, lack of transparency in the sector. Intertwined with human frailties such as, and mainly, untrammelled greed, excessive 'group think' and 'herd behaviour,' widespread intransparency engendered a fertile ground upon which scandals flourished. Post -crisis diagnostics have arguably steam-rolled into a governance discussion in which the need for transparency and the importance of ethical and moral aspects of economic activities within the financial services have come to the fore. This paper contributes to that discussion by building on the widely recognised fact that whistle blowing is an essential element of the transparency agenda and that it is a core element of a well-functioning risk management system , it seeks to make a contribution to the literature on global economic governance and financial transparency. The paper is a comparative examination of the degree to which Switzerland and South Africa have enhanced the transformative role of transparency through whistle blowing. This is a crucial quest especially in view of the fact that the recent financial crisis highlighted how internationalised the financial sector has become and demonstrated how, in the absence of harmonized policies and standards, the perils of systemic risk and cross border contagion can easily sp read through the global village's fault lines and vulnerabilities.
ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR TRANSPARENCY THROUGH WHISTLE BLOWING: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SWITZERLAND
In view of the intimate connections between the 2007-9 financial crisis, ineffective regulation and the scandals that preceded that calamity, 1 there have been increasing demands for the reevaluation and smarter coordination of the financial sector's governance, supervision and enforcement mechanisms with a view to preventing their recurrences. 2 Calls for changes in the current systems come on the backdrop of the recognition that the financial fiascos cast a shadow over the ability of codes of conduct, traditional supervisory and enforcement strategies to insulate the global financial sector from failure. instil trust and credibility eroded by inter alia, lack of transparency 4 in the sector. Intertwined with human frailties such as, and mainly, untrammelled greed, excessive 'group think' and 'herd behaviour,' 5 widespread intransparency engendered a fertile ground upon which scandals flourished. 6 Essentially therefore, post-crisis diagnostics have arguably steam-rolled into a governance discussion in which the need for transparency and the importance of ethical and moral aspects of economic activities within the financial services have come to the fore. 7 The understanding is that;
"Financial markets, when left to their own devices, have proven fertile grounds for disastrously bad behavior and poor decision making. Banks take on extreme leverage to fuel speculative and often foolhardy bets involving poorly understood investments; conflicts of interests can skew incentives such that analysts insufficiently assess and report risk; con men can develop fraudulent schemes to cheat investors out of their savings; and executives are empowered to act in their 4 See e.g. M Bouvard, P Chaigneau and A de Motta "Transparency in the financial system: Rollover risk and crises" Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper 700 (February 2012), available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingpapers/discussionpapers/fmgdps/dp700.pdf> (last accessed 9 See for instance A E Hofmeister "Whistleblowing. A suitable instrument to improve public corporate governance?", available at <http://www.sgvw.ch/d/Documents/Jahrbuch%20PDFs/Jahrbuch%202010/11_hofmeister.pdf> (last accessed 2 July 2014).
10 Lin "The new financial industry" (2014) 65/3 Alabama Law Review 567 at 591. 11 Prior to the financial crisis, reliance on risk-based regulation entailed use of meta-regulation where firms were given wider discretion to act according to their own interests. The rationale for this approach was an assumption that a 'command-and-control' environment would be counter-productive seeing as firms were better placed and able to recognize those systems and controls that required to be put in place established or adapted. Ultimately this had unintended consequences of making regulators out of touch with financial market issues. A major criticism of enrolling the regulated in the development of policies aimed at meeting the regulators' objectives is that it amounted to a renunciation of the regulatory agencies' enforcement duties. See for instance F Akinbami "Is meta-regulation all it's cracked up to be? tide has now shifted, the globalisation of the financial sector has brought about macroeconomic costs which include loss of national policy making independence, 36 and hence the urgent need for cohesion between global whistle blowing standards and Swiss mechanisms with a view to creating an integrated system of standards and codes of financial sector good practice.
This note does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of the various laws that govern disclosure of illegitimate behaviour; rather it seeks to provide an overview of the legislative approaches that govern disclosure of illicit conduct and the extent to which the two countries have sought to attain financial services transparency in the financial sector.
Recounting whistle blowing
While it lacks definitional exactitude and universal definitional acceptance, 37 whistle blowing has nonetheless been broadly recognized to entail either, a current or former employee or a contractor of an organisation making a disclosure of perceived illicit or immoral practices of that organisation to authorities who are tasked with taking appropriate action. 38 It may also emanate through an external source, a channel outside the organisation such as the law enforcement agency or the government. 39 The motive is generally to avert financial, physical or psychological harm. Although it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits of the concept, it is worth pointing out that, whistleblowing has been accepted a tool for maintaining and enhancing quality of governance and constitutes an essential element of a well-functioning risk management system. 41 More specifically, "whistle-blowers play a crucial role in organisational regulatory unit relationshipsproviding otherwise unobtainable information, enhancing the regulatory units' claims to defence of public interest and detracting from any organisation's claims of extreme or biased regulatory activity." over 500 European companies demonstrated that such companies suffered prejudice of more than EUR 3.6 billion through fraud 45 and scholars argue that corporations suffer more fraud occasioned by insiders than by external persons. 46 The utility of whistle blowing is reinforced further by the fact that acquiring and disclosing corporate insider information improves the functionality of the markets, in that when the markets have the adequate information they are better equipped to allocate resources to the sectors where they are required. 47 On the contrary, the absence of financial transparency may reverberate into the macroeconomic systems of a country. For instance it could be an effective tool in boosting illicit capital flight from developing countries. 48 Note should nevertheless be had of the fact that though commendable and popular, tipping about illicit conduct is in some quarters regarded as unethical and condemnable and is symptomatic of lack of loyalty to the organisation.
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The legislative mechanisms for whistleblowing in South Africa and Switzerland
The perception that whistle blowers are unprincipled individuals acts as a powerful vehicle which disincentiizes those who would otherwise want to report corporate wrongdoing.
Ordinarily whistle-blowers will only come forward when they have an assurance that their allegations will be investigated and actioned, and that there will be no retaliatory repercussions visited upon them by the individuals whose conduct has been reported. On that backdrop, legislation has been formulated not only to embolden employees to speak out against wrongdoing; but also to safeguard the whistle blowers from retribution. 50 The ensuing makes an attempt to examine the relevant Swiss and South African legislative framework that both seek to encourage tipping as well as providing protection to those who do so. clarity, section 1 of the PDA defines disclosure to encompass "…….disclosure of information regarding any conduct of an employer, or an employee of that employer, made by any employee who has reason to believe that the information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the following:
"(a) That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed;
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which that person is subject;
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur; (d) that the health or safety of an individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; (f) ….. The terms and conditions of employment of a person transferred in terms of subsection (2) may not, without his or her written consent, be less favourable than the terms and conditions applicable to him or her immediately before his or her transfer.
that provides an alternative channel through which employees may anonymously make reports on fraud and other allegations of impropriety in the workplace. PDA any contract that specifies that the employee will not disclose illegal or incorrect acts or information would be void. See also "A major scandal brews after Spain arrests HSBC whistleblower Falciani', available at: http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/240712/major-scandal-brews-after-spain-arrests-hsbcwhistleblower-falciani (last accessed 23 July 2014). "Whoever (a) discloses a secret which has been confided to him in his capacity as a member of a governing body, employee, agent, liquidator of a stock exchange or a securities dealer, or as a member of a governing body or employee of recognized auditors, or which he has become aware in his official capacity, or (b) attempts to induce such a breach of professional secrecy shall be liable to imprisonment or a fine"
The proscription captures both intentional and negligent disclosures of a customer's financial information 62 and because it is an ex officio offense, the Swiss government can prosecute violations of banking confidentiality at its instance without the injured party having filed a complaint. 63 The import of Article 47 is therefore to "punish disclosures that occur due to a lack of appreciation of the notion of secrecy" 64 and serves to protect such secrecy from all forms of intrusion. state are treated to be of greater importance than that of a customer's confidentiality. 73 It may also be varied where such disclosure is in the interest of the bank. It may also supersede client confidentiality where there is a duty to the public to disclose 74 or if client consents to such disclosure.
Whistleblowing culture in Switzerland and South Africa
What emerges from the above is that under Swiss law there is no specific statutory protection for whistle blowers in the financial sector. In an unfavourable environment which boasts of far-reaching confidentiality obligations and barriers, employees who report cases of malpractice within a company to the public are treated with cynicism and arguably do so at their own risk. Worse still, "[p]oliticians continue to be very reluctant to discuss the topic, and it is certainly not at the top of any agenda. Recent developments in other OECD countries and the recommendations of international organizations seem to have had no effect on decision makers in Switzerland." 75 Besides the dominance of labour laws that demand loyalty, equally disconcerting is the fact that cultural hurdles engender fear of reprisals which militates against any likelihood of whistle blowing. 76 The general societal attitude is that Swiss law serves to protect an individual's right to privacy and that this embraces both economic as well as purely personal affairs. 77 The rationale is that banking secrecy is the client's secrecy, not the bank's. handing over details of Americans whose assets are held in Swiss banks. 83 That exceptional case of piercing the banks secrecy should not be enough to cause celebration as that incidence has profound implications on Swiss domestic law sovereignty as well as the nation's strongly guarded culture of financial sector privacy. 84 The far-reaching effects of this and the continued umbrage at the enforced whistle blowing and this sovereignty-based reluctance to disclose information is best summarised by then Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline CalmyRey who reiterated the fact that the Swiss unwillingness to disclosure of financial information even in cases where foreign account-holders had violated laws of their country "… is about
Switzerland's sovereignty. We want our laws to be respected. It is also about our financial centers and about jobs." 85 Likewise, the then Finance Minister that reaffirmed Swiss banking secrecy and warned detractors that it would remain "a nut too hard to crack." 86 It follows therefore that in as far as the Swiss are concerned, any changes to the banking secrecy policies that are introduced, especially in response to international pressure, should be seen in the light of preventing abuse of banking secrecy and not eliminating the "professional" secrecy obligation on the part of the financial sector operatives. 87 For a country with a statute that specifically targets whistle blowing and one that boasts of an array of institutional features that are necessary to minimise corruption, particularly its constitution, an independent judiciary and a robust and proactive media all which arguably compare favourably compare with those of its more economically advanced counterparts in the G20 88 South Africa is expected to fare better. The irony however, is that taking into account such resources South Africa does not seem to have succeeded in curbing the existence of fraud or to encourage whistleblowing. 89 The regime is still best with problems; its regulation is said to be incomplete, a state of flux and there are inconsistencies relating its application and is riddled with gaps and concerns regarding its policy and implementation. 90 It has been established that, " The result, at a glance, is a splintered, but interrelated body of laws cutting across different departments and disciplines that are applied erratically by public and private organisations in a manner that has left whistleblowers, at risk of "victimisation, losing their job or damaging their career." 91 An interplay of cultural, political and historical factors can be said to constitute a barrier that shape people's attitude towards disclosure of wrong doing in organisations. Scholars have shown that within South Africa, whistle blowing is inhibited by the need for loyalty and fear of reprisals. Historically, prior to independence informants who disclosed any information to the apartheid government against the liberation cause were reviled and labelled as impimpi or sell outs. That mind-set is arguably a part of the cultures, that whistle blowing of organisational impropriety amounts to selling out and is treachery which society frowns on. 92 Additional impediments include lack of awareness of the protections accorded by the law. On the other hand, where such law is known, the perception that the law does not have the capacity to protect whistle blowers and hence disclosing information is a futile exercise as no action is likely to be taken to remedy the misconduct reported tend to militate against willingness to make disclosure. 93 Probably the greatest impediment is the lack of incentives to foster a culture of disclosure. So important is incentivising whistleblowing that it has been argued that part of the corporate governance related flaws linked to recent financial crisis was the regulators' underestimation of the utility of financial incentives in corporate whistleblowing. 94 Coming forward with information is associated with adverse consequences 95 and unless the rewards of making a disclosure outweigh the risks, individuals are bound to remain quiet.
A further concern has been said to be the PDA's failure to incorporate provision that require organisations to implement robust whistle blowing structures as part of their risk management culture. The protection afforded to disclosers of information by the regulatory framework has also been criticised for being inadequate and poor. Flaws are said to include the fact that it does not amount to an effective deterrent against employers who are intent on victimising the disclosing employee. 96 In the same manner, the scope of the framework is said to too narrow as protected disclosure is restricted to public and private sector employees to the exclusion of consultants, part-time and agency workers 97 and citizens who are in no whistle blowers, it also does not offer immunity against civil and criminal liability for making a protected disclosure. Such gaps in the South Africa regulatory provisions have undoubtedly worked against the legitimate intentions and objectives of the legislature and hence the need to for an evaluation of the regime with a view to making it robust. 99 What stands out from the above discussion is the fact South Africa and Switzerland have adopted widely divergent approaches in regulating disclosure of illegalities in the financial sector. What is reassuring in the case of South Africa and by contrast to Switzerland, is the fact that despite such flaws in the framework, South Africa has managed to build not only a relatively coherent system of disclosure but also a corpus of whistle blowing cases that can be used as a reference. 100 It is therefore clear that while it is a more mature economy with a long history in regulating its financial sector, when all factors are aggregated, the Swiss approach regulating whistle blowing in line with current global standards lags behind South Africa. This disparity however, is an apt demonstration of the common perspectives that influence the adoption of a disclosure regime; more specifically these two regimes evince the fact that subject to the preferred perception, "whistleblowing is either being considered an ethical and commendable or an unethical and condemnable behaviour. Thereby, the difference in perception is not driven by the stage of development of a given country, but rather by the political and social system." 101 Switzerland could build on the experience and examples of its fellow G-20's financial services and broaden the existing restricted operation of the whistle blower legislation. Unless Switzerland complies and brings its whistle blowing approach in line with its regional counterparts, when it comes to the minimisation of financial services misconduct, unfortunately "…Europe could continue to be a place of diverse policy-making, yet with a common ground."
102

Conclusion
That there is need for consistency and coordination in the governance and risk management of the financial sector with a view to minimising financial crime is not in doubt. Much as that is trite, this article has attempted to show how divergent the regulation of whistle-blowing is within selected countries and also demonstrates that the attainment of unified global standards is still work in progress. Whereas an analysis of the whistle blowing approach adopted in South Africa evinces a lot of weaknesses, the Swiss attitude to the disclosure of corporate malfeasance suggests that more could be done to build a supportive environment.
These are issues that need to be given serious consideration especially in light of the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis.
Objectionable financial industry behavior characterized by exponential self-preservation and predatory governance could be curtailed if there was a real possibility of such conduct being made public through whistle blowing. As such the Swiss and South African financial sector should be encouraged to build trust by introducing suitable whistleblowing policies and procedures. Considering how globalized the financial sector has become, it is important that nations come up with harmonized frameworks that not only increase accountability of financial institutions and their supervisors but also restore trust in the financial sector and that address transnational governance problems. The first step to accomplishing that objective is by comparing the approaches in various regimes and this article has attempted to do that by comparing the Swiss and South African mechanisms and concludes that there is need for a shift in the current mechanisms.
